Financial Dogma
by
Ross M. Miller
Miller Risk Advisors
www.millerrisk.com
February 12, 2007
Much of the consulting work I do amounts to one form or
another of reality checking. I got into the reality checking business
while at GE, where I spent over a year of my life flitting from one GE
Capital business to another in search of problems associated with the
abuse of quantitative models. Reality checking is not that difficult, you
look at what a model spits out and see if it makes any sense. I can say
from first-hand experience that people who build models are rarely happy
to receive a visit from a team of reality checkers, especially one that
modeled itself after the characters in the movie Reservoir Dogs.
As a professional reality checker, academic finance
journals do not make me very happy. If an article includes a model that is
about companies, it's nice to see what it has to say about GE, Wal-Mart,
Citigroup, Google, and any number of other idiosyncratic companies. If a
model is about mutual funds, then there is a similar group of funds that
one could throw at the model to put it through its paces. While lesser
finance journals frequently name names in their published results, the
highbrow journals rarely do and even appear to have a policy against doing
so. (Who the heck is "firm391" anyway?) While there are complex
psychological and sociological reasons for why this happens that I have no
desire to go into here, the bottom line is that it makes it impossible to
trust the results of such articles—not that anyone in their right mind
does anyway. While folks at GE cowered at the thought that I might set up
shop at their local Embassy Suites, shreds their models to bits, and get
them fired, academics have no such worries. (I once stayed in the
presidential suite at an Embassy Suites during a reality-checking visit—it
was of several bizarre experiences that are reflected in Rigged.)
I do name names in my articles and I have William Sharpe
to thank for it. His pioneering
article on style analysis used the Fidelity Magellan Fund as an
example, providing poor little me with a precedent for doing the same (and
then some). It is worth noting that these results appear in the Journal
of Portfolio Management, a largely practitioner-oriented journal that
most top-tier finance departments do not consider as a "real
journal," which means that any article published there does not count
toward tenure or promotion.
Finance journals do other things that make their results
essentially unauditable. It is rare than an article uses data that is
readily available to anyone who do not have access to datafeeds with
subscription fees that can exceed a hundred thousand dollars per year.
Even then, raw data must often be cleaned before being consumed.
Proprietary databases are also frequently employed. There are many
considerate researchers who make proprietary data available to the masses
for free, but frequently license agreements inhibit the sharing of data.
Moreover, at least data provider (Morningstar—see, I name names)
reserves the right to prevent the publication of any article that uses
data covered by the license if they do not like what the article says. (I
refused to sign the agreement, so I make minimal use of Morningstar data.)
Of course, there is a lot of finance that cannot be done
without the use of expensive data, just as there are movies that cannot be
made without spending gobs of money on explosions and Tom Cruise. In the
movie business, however, plenty of people get by without spending lots of
money, especially if they can fool frat boys and other drunk people into
saying stupid things.
Long before Mr. Cohen bailed out of Morgan and Goldman
and got in front of the camera, a group of Danish film directors started
their own rebellion against the big Hollywood studios in 1995. They called
their movement "Dogme 95,"
which translates into Dogma 95. This movement, which has nothing to do
with the Kevin Smith flick, laid
down some rules for making cheap, "realistic" movies. They
required, among other things, that handheld cameras be used and that
editing be kept to a minimum. Not much of anyone paid any attention to
this whole Dogme 95, mostly because they were dogmatic and a little bit
because not much of anyone speaks Danish, but their ideas, if not their
rules, caught on. TV shows from Survivor: Ikea to Arrested
Development as well as many indie movies are made in the spirit of
Dogme 95.
Finance could really use something like Dogme 95, but
without the rules. The underlying concept should be to create financial
research whose reality is easily checked. This includes naming names and
using datasets that can be readily replicated with free (over the
Internet) data.
This version of financial dogma may appear restrictive,
but it is not. Think about it for a moment. Suppose that you are at a
top-tier finance department that spends close to a million dollars a year
on data. If you not only fail to use that data, but instead use data that
any schlub with a dial-up connection can get for free, you will not make
friends, get tenure, or have an office any larger than a broom closet. If
this isn't an arbitrage opportunity, I don't know what is.
I already have one
article out that takes this new approach and it is scheduled for
publication this week. I show how to compute the "true cost of active
management," I name plenty of names (included dozens that are not in
the article but are in an online supplement to the "Money" story
about the article), and anyone with access to Yahoo! Finance or
Morningstar can do the same. I have yet to hear from anyone whose reality
test it flunked.
My next article, which will appear (barring a TRO) in
working paper form simultaneously with my next commentary, takes things a
step further. It is called "Stansky's Monster: A Critical Examination
of Fidelity Magellan's 'Frankenfund.'" Using only public
information from Morningstar, Yahoo! Finance, the Fama-French research
database, and Fidelity's filings on the SEC's Edgar system, this article
takes Magellan apart one stock at a time. And, yes, there are plenty of
references to the Frankenstein movies (though not Young Frankenstein—this
is a serious article); however, cinematic allusions are an optional
component of the new financial dogma.
Copyright 2007 by Miller Risk Advisors. Permission
granted to forward by electronic means and to excerpt or broadcast 250
words or less provided a citation is made to www.millerrisk.com.